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EDITORIAL COMMENTS
The Rule of Law in the Union, the Rule of Union Law and the Rule of Law by
the Union: Three interrelated problems
In a European Union beset by troubles, one of the challenges which perhaps
most closely engages the interest of legal scholars is the perceived crisis over
respect for the “rule of law”. In fact, it is possible to identify at least three
different “rule of law” problems facing the Union, none of them an entirely
novel phenomenon, but each of which should indeed give cause for concern.
The first is the challenge of securing respect for the rule of law within the
Union, in the face of certain national governments which appear half-hearted
in their own commitment to some of the basic democratic principles that are
meant to define the Member States’ shared constitutional values and provide
the foundation for membership of the Union.1 Readers will no doubt recall the
controversies which surrounded (for example) the entry of the far right
Freedom Party of Austria into a coalition government in 2000;2 or how Prime
Minister Berlusconi had accumulated such a degree of power over the national
media as was alleged to endanger Italy’s proper democratic functioning.3 So
the more recent developments gripping Hungary and Poland at least have their
antecedents – even if many commentators feel these current “rule of law”
disputes to be of a rather more sinister character. The European Parliament
continues to lead the charge sheet against the Orbán regime in Budapest:
complaints about the official treatment and portrayal of migrants have been
added to an already long list of alleged abuses, such as restrictions on
academic freedom of expression and the activities of civil society,
discrimination against ethnic and sexual minorities and attacks on the
independence of the judiciary.4 For its part, in January 2016, the Commission
took the unprecedented step of formally implementing the EU Framework to
Strengthen the Rule of Law against Poland – initiating a structured dialogue
with the government of the ruling Law and Justice Party over the latter’s
increasingly worrying approach to the independence and authority of the
Constitutional Tribunal as well as its reforms to the regulation of public
1. On which, of course, see Art. 2 TEU.
2. Leading directly to the temporary imposition of diplomatic sanctions against Austria by
the other Member States of the Union (14 at that time).
3. A situation indeed investigated, inter alia, by the European Commission for Democracy
Through Law (Venice Commission): see, e.g. CDL-AD(2005)017 and CDL-AD(2013)038.
4. See, e.g. Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary (P8_TA(2015)0227);
Resolution of 16 Dec. 2015 on the situation in Hungary (2015/2935(RSP)).
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service broadcasters.5 And let’s not even mention the rapidly deteriorating
state of the democratic order in Turkey, just as the Union promises to inject
fresh impetus into Ankara’s accession dreams, as part of the March 2016 deal
to bring some semblance of control over the unrelenting migration crisis.6
The second problem is that of securing respect for the rule of Union law, in
the face of the willingness of certain Member States – whether acting through
their political or instead their judicial institutions – to qualify or even repudiate
obligations which should be regarded as legally binding under the Treaties
themselves. Of course, national judicial reservations over, and even
challenges to, the supremacy of Union law, whether on paper or in practice, are
hardly anything new: the journals are replete with such examples and
discussion going back over a period of several decades almost to the time of
Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL themselves.7 But over recent years,
respect for the authority of binding obligations created under EU law has
perhaps felt particularly fragile. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court
has elaborated its jurisdiction to scrutinize the legality of Union acts – now
available on human rights, ultra vires and constitutional identity grounds –
culminating in the rather tense “judicial dialogue” with the ECJ during the
Gauweiler dispute.8 But the German Government has hardly been setting any
better example: Chancellor Merkel’s unilateral decision to open the arms of
the German nation to countless new migrants (whatever other views one
might hold about it) effectively tore a massive hole right through the
applicable EU asylum legislation – even if Germany was merely dealing the
coup de grace to a system whose proper functioning had already fallen into
disorder and disrepair elsewhere in Europe.9 Even the United Kingdom – a
Member State which has long proved itself to be an awkward negotiator when
it comes to making the rules, but a faithful servant of the law once those rules
have been made – is showing its less clubbable side. The European Union Act
2011 has reaffirmed the sovereignty of Parliament to make and unmake
5. Commission, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014)158
Final/2. See the Commission MEMO/16/62 outlining the College of Commissioners’
orientation debate on Poland (held in Brussels on 13 Jan. 2016).
6. See EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016.
7. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, EU:C:1964:34.
8. See the Order of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 14 Jan. 2014 (2 BvR
2728/13); and the Judgment of the ECJ in Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:400.
9. And let’s be fair: Council Decision 2015/1523 (O.J. 2015, L 239/146), intended to ensure
a fairer distribution of migrants in need of international protection, has thus far hardly inspired
devoted observance by the Member States. For a broad critique of the EU’s legal framework on
refugees, see further in this Review Den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer, “Coercion,
prohibition, and great expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum
System”, 000-000.
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any law regardless of the UK’s obligations under the Treaties.10 The Supreme
Court now openly discusses the degree to which national constitutional
principles should inherently qualify the UK’s respect for the supremacy of
Union law and the jurisdiction of the ECJ.11 And in a sense, the UK’s
membership referendum in June 2016 takes the challenge to the Union’s
authority to its extreme but logical conclusion: withdrawal would represent
the ultimate act of repudiation against the rule of Union law;12 even more so if
(as feared) a potential UK departure triggers some sort of chain reaction in
other Member States whose political discourse risks being similarly hijacked
by ideological Europhobia.13
The third problem is that of securing respect for the rule of law by the Union
itself, in the face of allegations that, in the quest to find effective or at least
plausible responses to the various crises which have dominated European
affairs over several truly difficult years, the Union institutions have been
willing to bend the rules laid down in the Treaties and compromise the
Union’s observance of its own binding legal obligations. Yet again, such
problems are hardly unprecedented in nature: one need only refer to the
age-old debate about “competence creep” by the Union institutions, through
an allegedly over-zealous recourse to legal bases such as Article 114 TFEU or
Article 352 TFEU, in supposed contravention of the fundamental
constitutional principle of attributed powers.14 But yet again, there is perhaps
a contemporary sense that the problem has grown more acute – whether
through its scale, its nature or simply its changed political context. Over and
over, as the financial and credit crisis gave way to the sovereign debt and single
currency crisis, the wide-ranging measures adopted by the Union institutions
and the Member States have been savaged by scholarly and political criticism
that the rule of law within the EU is (in various ways) being compromised in
order to save the euro.15 Similar reactions now accompany the Union’s various
efforts to tackle the migration crisis – with both internal initiatives and
external agreements regularly criticized for allegedly compromising binding
10. See further e.g. Craig, “The European Union Act 2011: Locks, limits and legality”, 48
CML Rev. (2011), 1915.
11. See especially R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014]
UKSC 3 and Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19.
12. Even though, of course, the actual right of withdrawal is expressly provided for under
Art. 50 TEU.
13. One thinks here of the Dutch referendum in April 2016 rejecting national ratification of
the EU’s association agreement with Ukraine.
14. See further, e.g. Weatherill, “Competence creep and competence control”, 23 YEL
(2004), 1.
15. See further, e.g. Ruffert, “The European debt crisis and European Union law”, 48 CML
Rev. (2011), 1777; Chiti and Gustavo Teixeria, “The constitutional implications of the
European responses to the financial and public debt crisis”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 683.
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human rights commitments, often accompanied more or less explicitly by the
insinuation that the Union’s only real objective here is to safeguard the
long-term functioning of the Schengen arrangements.16 Think also of the
February 2016 deal to keep the UK within the Union on reformed terms of
membership: the proposed changes to Union legislation governing the free
movement and equal treatment of migrant workers, in particular, have been
attacked as incompatible with the hierarchically superior rights laid down
directly by the Treaties themselves.17 Small matter that some such criticisms
appear to be based primarily on their author’s own subjective preferences
concerning the proper scope and interpretation of the Union’s constitutional
commitments and legal obligations: throw enough mud and some of it
eventually sticks in the popular mind… is this a Union that sacrifices its own
rule of law on the altar of political expediency?
Of course, each of those three phenomena is of significant importance in its
own right. But the question is also worth considering: how far might these
various “rule of law” challenges also add up to something greater than the sum
of their individual parts? That is not to suggest for a moment that it is worth
searching for or imagining some single, coherent phenomenon which might
be at work here. It is obvious that our three “rule of law” challenges each have
their own distinct causes and contexts. Indeed, even within each one of our
three “rule of law” conundrums, meaningful explanations and identifiable
experiences will differ considerably across both the affected Member States
and the relevant policy fields. But that does not rule out the possibility that our
three “rule of law” scenarios might indeed share certain direct or indirect
points of contact, with the opportunity to exercise some degree of mutual
influence.
After all, we know that perceived troubles over respect for the rule of law by
the Union itself have led directly to specific problems with adherence to the
rule of Union law within certain Member States. It is precisely the sense that
the Union institutions have taken an excessively broad interpretation of their
own competences – including the Court of Justice in the exercise of its judicial
functions – which contributed to prompting the German Federal
Constitutional Court and the UK Supreme Court each to articulate the limits
laid down under domestic law to respect for the supremacy of Union rules and
the jurisdiction of the ECJ.18 And in a perhaps less tangible sense, it can do
16. Particularly the compatibility with both EU law and international law of the agreement
reached between the EU and Turkey on 18 March 2016.
17. In particular, the proposals to amend Regulation 492/2011 so as to introduce a
“safeguard mechanism” limiting the equal treatment rights of migrant Union workers: see
European Council Conclusions of 18–19 Feb. 2016.
18. In Germany, e.g. the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court delivered on 6 July 2010
(2 BvR 2661/06) and 24 April 2013 (1 BvR 1215/07). In the UK, e.g. the rulings of the
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little to help the Union’s moral authority in persuading its own Member States
to respect the binding force of Union law, when the Union institutions
themselves are regularly accused of overreaching the limits of their own
powers. A similar tension is surely at work when it comes to tackling alleged
infringements of basic rule of law values by Member States such as Hungary
or Poland: it becomes an easy matter for Orbán or the Law and Justice Party to
dismiss as hypocritical the criticism of their European partners, simply by
pointing to the latter’s own shortcomings, whether in the Union’s
commitment to the rule of law under the Treaties or in the commitment by
other Member States to the rule of Union law within their respective
territories.
One might, however, argue that adverse influences can also flow in the
opposite direction. Of course the Union needs to be seen to take a credible
stance against systemic threats to the rule of law (not to mention the rule of
Union law) within certain Member States. Failure to do so risks drawing the
accusation that the EU is either unwilling or unable to enforce the fundamental
values it is meant to embody and uphold. Indeed, the Union’s prevarication in
the face of domestic rule of law problems risks being portrayed as another
example of the triumph of politics over principle within the Union’s own
constitutional experience.19 But even presupposing a genuine willingness to
act, the Union institutions face a new dilemma: what powers actually lay at
their disposal; and what are the implications of seeking to exercise those
powers?
In certain situations, initiatives that threaten basic rule of law values within
a particular Member State can also entail a clear and direct challenge to that
country’s respect for the supremacy of Union law itself. In particular, where
primary Treaty rules or Union secondary law embody specific aspects of
more general rule of law values, and translate them into concrete binding
obligations, the Member State’s actions might trigger a direct incompatibility
with its Treaty obligations – actionable before the national courts (through
the doctrine of direct effect) and the EU courts (via infringement proceedings
under Art. 258 TFEU). The legal actions initiated against Hungary, albeit
limited to particular aspects of the Orbán regime’s wide-ranging reforms,
illustrate the Union’s capacity to show some hard edges in its response to
Supreme Court in R (HS2ActionAlliance Ltd) v. Secretary of State forTransport [2014] UKSC
3 and Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19.
19. One thinks here of the controversies which surrounded France’s demolition of Roma
camps, and mass deportation of migrant Roma, particularly since 2010.
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domestic measures which simultaneously challenge both rule of law values in
general and the rule of Union law in particular.20
Yet the Union’s attempts to respond to rule of law problems within a
particular Member State can also run the risk of aggravating national
resistance to accepting and respecting the rule of Union law itself. That might
be true precisely in those same situations where general rule of law values
have been embodied in binding and actionable Union law obligations: after
all, a Member State’s persistent refusal to comply with the Treaties would
represent a more serious challenge to the principle of supremacy for Union
law within that domestic jurisdiction. But the problem might also arise in
those situations where the Union cannot point to any specific legal duty
incumbent upon the relevant Member State as a matter of directly effective
Treaty rules or Union secondary law; and its concerns instead relate to rule of
law problems which fall within the scope of the Treaties only by virtue of the
general commitment by the Member States to respect basic democratic values,
inherent in their shared membership of the Union and understood as essential
for the mutual trust upon which its constitutional operation ultimately
depends.
That is the broader domain rightly occupied by the system of prevention and
sanctioning as provided for under Article 7 TEU; as well as the more informal
frameworks based on degrees of monitoring, assessment and dialogue as
organized by both the Commission and the Council.21 Here, the risk is that the
Union’s efforts to negotiate with but also ultimately penalize a country which
endangers basic rule of law values, even in the absence of any concrete
infringement of specific obligations imposed by Union legislation, might
provoke the relevant Member State into challenging the Union’s very
authority and legitimacy. It is an easy retort even for a government bent on
fostering authoritarianism, to accuse the distant Union of meddling in the
internal affairs of a sovereign State. And EU criticism may well risk setting off
a popular backlash in support of the elected national administration, thus
20. E.g. Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687. Consider also e.g. the
infringement proceedings commenced by the Commission on 10 Dec. 2015 against Hungary in
respect of the latter’s asylum legislation (Press Release IP/15/6228). Cf. our Editorial
Comments, “Hungary’s new constitutional order and ‘European unity’”, 49 CML Rev. (2012),
871.
21. See Commission,ANewEUFramework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014)158
Final/2.And Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and the Member States meeting
within the Council on ensuring respect for the rule of law (16 Dec. 2014).
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bolstering rather than undermining the latter’s ability to pursue repressive
domestic policies.22
Furthermore, the Union’s attempts to tackle general rule of law problems
arising at the national level can also raise (or at least provoke) some difficult
questions (justified or otherwise) about respect by the Union institutions for
the scope and limits of their own competences as defined under the Treaties.23
For example, it has been suggested that the general commitment to upholding
democratic constitutional principles, as undertaken by the Member States and
imposed upon the Union institutions through the Treaties, in itself amounts to
a directly binding obligation capable of justifying infringement proceedings
under Article 258 TFEU against regimes which fail to respect basic rule of
law standards – even in those situations which might otherwise have been
assumed to fall outside the strict scope of Union law – perhaps through the
medium of the Member State’s duty of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3)
TEU.24 That might well offer a valuable weapon in the fight against a growing
trend towards authoritarianism in certain parts of Europe – but for many, it
would also stretch accepted understandings about the nature and limits of both
the Member States’ binding obligations and the EU institutions’ rightful
enforcement powers under the current Treaties.
Similarly, both past and present Commission initiatives to strengthen the
framework for monitoring, assessing and responding to alleged rule of law
problems within a particular Member State have been criticized for lacking
any clear legal basis under the Treaties and thereby overstepping the powers
properly attributed to the Union institutions.25 One might protest that such
criticisms are lacking in any convincing basis: after all, what could possibly be
the objection, under the principle of conferred powers, to the Commission
offering the opportunity for political dialogue with a Member State as an
essentially preventive measure aimed at avoiding formal recourse to a power
22. A point noted in the Ahtisaari, Frohwein, Oreja Report into the EU’s sanctions against
Austria (adopted in Paris on 8 Sept. 2000, especially para 116). See also Eurobarometer Report
Number 53 (October 2000).
23. See further on the constitutional context of the potential EU and Member State
responses to rule of law problems within particular countries, e.g. von Bogdandy and Ioannidis,
“Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What is it, what has been done, what can be done”,
51 CML Rev. (2014), 59. Also, e.g. von Bogdandy et al, “Reverse Solange: Protecting the
essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 489; Canor,
“My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: ‘An ever closer distrust among the peoples of
Europe’”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 383.
24. See the discussion in our previous Editorial Comments, “Safeguarding EU Values in
the Member States: Is Something Finally Happening?”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 619.
25. Consider, e.g. the views of the Council Legal Service (Doc No 10296/14) discussed in
the Note from the Presidency to the Council, “Ensuring respect for the rule of law in the
European Union” (Doc No 15206/14).
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of sanction explicitly provided for under the Treaties? Yet even such
manufactured uncertainty over the precise content of the Union’s competence
to tackle national rule of law problems still risks fuelling fresh concerns about
the Union’s own commitment to respecting the rule of law as laid down in the
Treaties – in effect, a vicious circle of tit-for-tat accusations and
counter-accusations across our three “rule of law” domains which can only
further sap the individual and collective moral authority of Europe’s political
institutions.
So: there are indeed some important mutual influences that serve to link up
the otherwise distinct challenges facing the rule of law in the Union, the rule
of Union law and the rule of law by the Union. But it is worth concluding with
a few observations on some further connections that undoubtedly weave
together our various “rule of law” issues. In particular, it is striking just how
far the twin krakens of the eurozone crisis and the migration crisis together
provide the backdrop and indeed the raw material for many of the worst
problems we have just described: from some of the most serious allegations
levelled against Hungary’s respect for fundamental democratic values;
through much of the German judicial and political disquiet with the smooth
reception and operation of Union law within the national legal system; to
many of the most damaging criticisms made of the extent of the Union’s own
willingness to play by the rules laid down in the Treaties. Indeed, one might
argue that the sad predicament of long-suffering Greece is the very
embodiment of how the debt and migration crises can each and together fuel
a complex mixture of overlapping rule of law challenges – most obviously
when it comes to a Member State’s failing capacity to ensure compliance with
its Union obligations, but also evident in the constitutional concerns raised
(often from very different perspectives) by the Union’s own engagement with
Greece.
On the one hand, it might be argued that, were it not for the aggravations
brought about through the eurozone and migration crises, we would not
perceive the Union’s various rule of law problems to be nearly so acute as they
currently appear. Indeed, one might reasonably expect that some easing in the
serious problems continuing to affect the long term stability of the single
currency, and / or those posed by the gigantic movement of third country
nationals across European borders, should help reduce the chief drivers that lie
behind many of the Union’s recent “rule of law” troubles – and perhaps even
make it easier to tackle the remainder. On the other hand, it might equally well
be argued that the eurozone and migration crises have merely brought to the
fore certain inherent weaknesses in the Union’s constitutional order: we are
witnesses to the limits of centralized legal competence and political authority
when it comes to securing the cooperation and marshalling the activities of a
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now large and highly diverse group of countries as regards a growing range of
deeply controversial socio-economic policy challenges. If so, it suggests that
the persistence, intensification and multiplication of “rule of law” problems
are not simply the by-product of any particular crisis or even constellation of
crises, but are somehow endemic to the Union in its existing configuration.
Either way, we would do well to keep all these problems in some proper
perspective. Europe is not just about crises: the internal market, environmental
protection, employment rights, consumer protection, education and research
policy… such historic achievements form a stable core to the Union’s
activities and deliver concrete benefits to the Member States and their peoples
on a daily basis. It may well be that the Union has also found itself – partly
through choices of its own making, partly by dint of external pressures –
charged with certain near-impossible responsibilities, i.e. of responding to
problems for which there simply are no meaningful solutions within the
realistic grasp of our public institutions acting within the constraints of our
existing constitutional orders. In such circumstances, the Union’s task is
effectively one of endless and thankless crisis management – and the real
challenge for political as well as legal discourse is to adjust our expectations
of what the Union should reasonably be considered capable of delivering in
such troubled contexts (judged not least against what the Member States could
possibly have achieved in the absence of a Union contribution).26 But in that
case, we need to work consciously and work hard to limit the emergence of an
unjustified negative feedback loop: the sorts of problems we might have to
accept as all but inevitable in and around the unstable realm of crisis
management – even when it comes to certain “rule of law” contestations –
should not seep noxiously back into the concepts, structures and practices that
have made such a success of the Union’s activities under more stable
conditions; nor be allowed to rewrite the popular discourse about European
integration into an unfair and inaccurate narrative of institutional paralysis,
policy failure and cynical realpolitik.
26. Cf. our Editorial Comments, “From eurocrisis to asylum and migration crisis: Some
legal and institutional considerations about the EU’s current struggles”, 52 CML Rev. (2015),
1437.
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